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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW2
CIVIL LIABILITY TO STOCKHOLDERS UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
REMEDY BY CLASS ACTION
Jacob Green*
This article treats in some detail liabilities under the Securities
Act of 1933. It should be noted that there are other private remedies
that may be available to stockholders, including (1) those otherwise
available at common law or in equity, (2) remedies, expressed or
implied, under state blue sky laws, and (3) remedies, expressed or
implied, under other federal securities statutes.1 The Securities Act
specifically provides that its remedies are additional to any other
remedies at law or in equity,' and it has been stated that the various
federal statutory remedies "are concurrent and not mutually exclu-
sive."'
However, the most effective remedies, particularly in conjunction
with the class action device, are those under the Securities Act.
A. THE CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES Acr
The general policy of the Securities Act is to provide for "full
disclosure of every essentially important element" attending a dis-
tribution of securities.4 The disclosure required is the registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of all non-exempt'
primary' offerings, as well as all non-exempt secondary distributions
by persons who "control" the issuer of the security. The statute also
requires the delivery of a prospectus, which is the principal part of
the registration statement, to each prospective investor. Even in the
case of a secondary distribution, it is the issuing corporation, rather
than the seller of the securities, which files the registration statement.
The statute thus makes no distinction between primary and second-
ary distributions insofar as civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
* Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts; member, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia and
Alabama Bars; B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1945; LL.B., Harvard Law
School, 1950.
1 E.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 a-hh, Trust and In-
denture Act of 1939. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 aaa-bbbb.
2 Securities Act of 1933 § 16, 48 Stat. 84(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 p(1958).
3 Wilco v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
4 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
5 The most important exemptions are (a) securities sold only to residents of a
single state where the issuer is also located, (b) offerings of no more than $300,-
000 under S.E.C. Regulations and (c) private offerings. Exemptions are enumer-
ated in §§ 3 and 4 of the Securities Act, 72 Stat. 694 (1958), 68 Stat. 684
(1954), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 c and d (1958).6 In a primary offering the proceeds of sale go to the corporation or "issuer." A
secondary distribution involves outstanding securities and the proceeds of sale go
to the holder thereof.
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for misstatements or omissions in the registration statement are
concerned.
1. Lability under Section 11
Congress enacted Section 11 in order to insure both accuracy and
care on the part of management and others who participate in the
preparation of registration statements. It imposes civil liability in
favor of a purchaser of a registered security if the registration state-
ment contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, and if the purchaser
did not know of such untruth or omission.
Essentially Section 11 creates a statutory deceit action, but with a
number of important differences from common-law deceit:
(1) The plaintiff may be any person who acquired a registered
security, even a buyer in the open market. There is no privity re-
quirement, thus opening liability to an indefinite succession of buy-
ers, subject only to the statute of limitations and other defenses.
(2) Those subject to suit include, (a) every person who signed
the registration statement, which under Section 6,8 consists of the
issuer itself and its principal officers; (b) every director; (c) every
underwriter; (d) if the misstatement or omission is within their
respective fields, various participating experts such as accountants,
attorneys, appraisers and engineers; and (e) persons who control
any of the above persons.' Here again there is no privity require-
ment.
(3) The plaintiff need not allege reliance, causation or scienter,
except that reliance must be alleged (though it may be established
without proof of the plaintiff having read the registration state-
ment) in the case of a plaintiff who bought after the issuer "has
made generally available to its security holders an earning statement
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the
effective date of the registration statement."10
(4) Under a proviso in Section 11 (e), damages are reduced to
the extent that the defendant affirmatively proves lack of causation,
that is, to the extent that the defendant proves that the damages
represent something other than depreciation in the value of the
security resulting from the misstatement or omission complained of.
7 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
8 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f (a) (1958).
9 Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958).
10 § 11(a), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (a) (1958).
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(5) As a substitute for the traditional scienter element of com-
mon law deceit, certain affirmative defenses are available to defend-
ant officers, directors and underwriters.1 Any such defendant may
establish that "he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time . . . the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading." The standard of reasonableness for the above purposes is
"'that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property."' 2 This affirmative defense is to be contrasted with the
traditional double negative form of defense to scienter alleged in a
deceit action, namely, that the defendant had no reasonable ground
to believe and did not believe, at the time the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that
there was an omission of a material fact.' This latter type of de-
fense is available to an officer, director or underwriter only in regard
to any part of the registration statement purporting to be made on
the authority of an expert other than himself (for example, the
certifying accountant). Thus Congress put an affirmative duty on
officers, directors and underwriters "as regards any part of the regis-
tration statement iot purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert.' ' 4
(6) The issuer itself does not have even this limited defense of
due care. The only defense available to the issuer (and it is also
available to other defendants) is to prove affirmatively that the
plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission at the time of his acquisi-
tion. 5
(7) The measure of damages, subject to mitigation on proof by
a defendant of lack of causation as mentioned in (4) above, is, in
substance, the buyer's purchase price less the value at the time of
suit, except that the purchase price is limited to the price at which
the security was offered to the public when the registration statement
became effective.'"
(8) The statute of limitations provides that the action must be
brought within one year after the untrue statement or omission was
11 § 11(b) (3), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1958).
12 § 11(c), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1958). This is also the ac-
cepted common law standard of care under a fiduciary relationship. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 174 (1957).
13 23 AM. JuR, Fraud and Deceit §§ 122-4 (1954).
14 § 11(b) (3) (A), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1958).
15 § 11(a), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958).
16 § 11(c), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1958).
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discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reason-
able diligence, and in any event within three years after the security
"was bona fide offered to the public."' 7
(9) Under Section 22 (a) there is a nationwide service of
process.'8
Section 11 has essentially an in terrorem purpose-to make direc-
tors assert positive control over the preparation and content of reg-
istration statements, under the risk of substantial civil liability unless
they can affirmatively establish that they exercised due care. 9 This
is also true of the other persons who are potential defendants under
Section 11.
2. Liability under Section 12 (1)
Section 12 (1) imposes a civil liability, in rescission or for dam-
ages, on any person who offers or sells a security in interstate corn.
merce before a registration statement has been filed and has become
effective, or if he fails to send a proper prospectus to the purchaser."
This liability is virtually absolute, unless the defendant can prove
that the security or transaction was exempt from the registration
requirements of Section 5.1 The seller's intent and knowledge of
the violation are entirely irrelevant in an action under Section 12
(1) .2 However, only the immediate seller or a person who controls
a seller23 is liable, and he is so whether he sells directly or through
a broker. Hence, although liability under this section is extremely
strict, Section 12 (1) applies to a much smaller group of persons
than Section 11.
An action under this section must be brought within one year after
the violation upon which it is based,24 and in no event more than
three years after the security was "bona fide offered to the public,"
which presumably means first offered to the public."
3. Liability under Section 12 (2)
Section 12 (2) is broader than Section 11 as to the transactions
included in that it applies to all sales made by use of the mails or
interstate facilities, whether or not the security has been registered.
17 § 13, 48 Stat 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
18 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1958). This is also true in actions
under §§ 12(1) and (2), 68 Stat. 686 (1954) 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1) and (2)
(1958).
'9 For a discussion of legislative purpose, see S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1933).
20 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1958).
21 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
22 Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 1693 (1961) and cases cited.
23 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958).
24 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
25 Loss, op. cit. supra note 22, 1742.
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But it is narrower than Section 11 as to the parties affected in that
it contemplates an action simply by the buyer against his seller. It
is traceable to the traditional actions of rescission and deceit, but
again with important modifications.
Section 12 (2) provides:
Any person who-
... offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sus-
tain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to receive the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.26
Section 12 (2) thus differs from Section 11 in the following im-
portant respects:
(1) Once more the plaintiff need not allege reliance, causation or
scienter. But, presumably as a substitute for the required allegation
of reliance at common law, or to a limited extent the reliance re-
quired under the last paragraph of Section 11 (a), the plaintiff does
have to allege his own lack of knowledge of the untruth or omis-
sion. Under Section 11 this is a matter of affirmative defense.
(2) Every defendant has available the affirmative defense that
he personally did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the untruth or omission.
(3) There is no affirmative defense of lack of causation, or pro-
vision for mitigation of damages by reason of any such showing, as
in Section 11.
(4) No measure of damages is specified when the plaintiff no
longer owns the security. However, since damages are a substitute
for rescission, in such a situation "damages are to be measured so as
to result in the substantial equivalent of rescission-namely, the
26 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
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difference between the purchase price and the plaintiff's resale price,
plus interest, and less any income or return of capital received on
the security by the plaintiff. 2  Hence, the purchase price used to
measure damages is the actual price paid by the plaintiff, as in Sec-
tion 11.
(5) The one-year statute of limitations is the same under Section
12 (2) as under Section 11. It runs from the date the untrue state-
ment or omission was discovered or reasonably should have been
discovered. However, the three-year maximum period runs from the
date of the particular sale rather than the date that the security "was
bona fide offered to the public."
28
In summary, it may be stated that although liability under Section
12 applies to a smaller group of persons than Section 11, the de-
fenses available under this section are not as extensive as those under
Section 11.
4. Provisions common to Section 11, 12 (1) and 12 (2)
Suit may be brought under any of the above sections "either at
law or in equity, any court of competent jurisdiction," which in-
dudes the district courts of the United States and state courts. "Any
such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the de-
fendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the
district where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant partici-
pated therein," and there is nationwide service of process. 9
It has been held that an action under the Securities Act survived
the death of an officer, where the complaint alleged personal wrong-
doing on his part." It should be noted that the SEC statutes contain
no specific provision nor is there any general federal provision on
the question of whether these actions survive the death of a plaintiff
or defendant or whether they are assignable.
If judgment is obtained the court may assess costs, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, against the unsuccessful litigant. The court
may also in its discretion at the outset of the suit require an under-
taking by the plaintiff for the payment of the defendant's costs, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees, if the court believes the suit to be
without merit.2 ' It thus behooves a stockholder or former stock-
27 Loss, op. cit supra note 22, 1721.
28 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
29 § 22, 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (a) (1958).
30 Derderian v. The Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For a
discussion of survivability and assignability of actions under the SEC statutes, see
Loss, op. cit supra note 22, 1817-19.
31 § 11(e), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1958).
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holder to think twice before bringing an action under the Securities
Act.
5. Possible Action under Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10 b-5
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
unlawful for any person in interstate commerce or by the mails or
on any national securities exchange to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules as the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may prescribe."
SEC Rule 10 b-5 under the above section requires only proof of
fraud or material misstatement or omission in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security in any of the situations mentioned
above. Many courts have now recognized the existence of a private
implied remedy under Rule 10 b-S.Y3 However, there is a split of
authority as to whether an action can be brought under Rule 10 b-5
by a buyer as well as a seller. One court has held that Section 10 (b)
of the 1934 Act was not intended to supplant Section 11 of the 1933
Act and that an action for alleged misstatements in a Securities Act
registration statement could be brought only under Section 11 of the
Securities Act. " However, other courts have allowed suit by a buyer
under Rule 10 b-5, so long as fraud was alleged, without applying
the restrictions of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Securities Act. "
Hence, one should not lose sight of the possibility that an action
under Rule 10 b-5 may rescue a purchaser who alleges and proves
fraud from several important restrictions imposed upon him in ac-
tions under the Securities Act of 1933:
(1) He is not limited to rescission or a rescission measure of
damages."
(2) He is not bound by the short statute of limitations imposed
by Section 13 of the Securities Act. Rather, he can enjoy the substan-
tially longer period usuallygranted by state law, since the 1934 Act
is silent concerning the statute of limitations."
(3) There is no provision applying to Section 10 (b) of the 1934
Act under which he may be required to post security for costs or to
32 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1958).
33 See Loss, op. cit. supra note 22, 1763 and cases cited.
34 Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See
also Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
35 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-88 (2nd Cir. 1961); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
36 See Loss, op. cit. supra note 22, 1792-96.
37 Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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pay defendant's counsel fees, as there is in actions under the Securi-
ties Act.
One possible justification for allowing Rule 10 b-5 actions by a
purchaser to supplant the Securities Act provisions is that actions
under the Securities Act may be brought by a purchaser where there
is mere negligence or innocent misrepresentation as well as where
there is fraud, whereas actions under Rule 10 b-5, under most deci-
sions, can be brought by a purchaser only where there is fraud.38
B. CLASS AcTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
As we have seen, although the exposure to liabilities under the
Securities Act is great, there are numerous defenses available and
the task of the aggrieved stockholder in protecting and enforcing
his rights is not always an easy one. This is particularly true in the
case of a small stockholder who may have lost at most several thou-
sand dollars which, although a lot of money to the particular indi-
vidual, would not begin to cover counsel fees and expenses in an
action where he is pitted against a large corporation, or a group of
underwriters, or controlling stockholders who recently have realized
millions from the public offering in question, or all of the above.
Hence, as a practical matter unless the aggrieved stockholder can
induce other stockholders similarly situated to join with him, or
unless he can bring suit on behalf of such other stockholders, the
Securities Act would be virtually ineffective except in the case of a
very large investor. Thus, in a nation of small investors, without the
class suit device, Section 11 in particular could hardly play the in
terrorem role which Congress envisaged for it. 9
1. Propriety of the Class Action
An action may be brought under the Securities Act in either the
state or federal courts and there is nationwide service of process.4"
Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in
the federal courts and in those state courts which have adopted the
Federal Rules." This rule provides as follows:
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one
or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all
38 But see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) in which the court stated
that a complaint under Clause (2) of Rule 10 b-5 did not have to allege "genuine
fraud" as distinct from a mere misstatement or omission. 291 F.2d at 274.
39 S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); Loss, op. cit. supra note 22,
1819.
40 § 22, 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1958).
41 E.g. Delaware. Rule 23, Rules of the Chancery Court of the State of Delaware
(1947), 13 WEST'S DEL. CODE ANN. 112.
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may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the
right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (1) joint, or
common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce the right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it; (2) several, and the object of the
action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action; or (3) several, and there is a
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
a common relief is sought.
The above categories of class actions have been termed "true,"
"hybrid" and "spurious" respectively,42 although it is submitted that
a more definitive term for the third category would be "common
question" class action.
Class actions under the Securities statutes must be brought, if at
all, as common question class actions under Federal Rule 23 (a) (3),
or its equivalent in those states which have adopted the Federal
Rules.
Whatever may have been the case when Federal Rule 23 (a) (3),
was adopted, by now it has been applied in so many actions in the
securities field, both under the SEC statutes and otherwise, that its
availability to buyers or sellers of securities is not to be doubted.
(a) There Is a Common Question of Law or Fact.
The questions of misstatement, materiality, and reasonable care
under Sections 11 and 12 (2) and causation under Section 11 are
certainly common questions of both law and fact as required by the
Rule. " Non-statutory dass actions in the securities field also have
been allowed.'-
Similarly the question of violation of the registration or prospec-
tus requirements under Section 12 (1) would be a common question
or law or fact with respect to all purchasers who bought prior to
the requirements being complied with. Obviously, there will be some
stockholders who will not be in an identical position with the par-
ticular plaintiff. There will be still others who will be excluded from
42 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTMCE ff 23.03, (2d ed. 1948).
43 For actions under the SEC statutes, see Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108
F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940);
Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 389-90 (2d Cir. 1944);
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963); Mills
v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 762-63 (D.N.J. 1955) semble; Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 833, reafl'd, 100 F. Supp. 461, 462-63 (D. Del.
1951).
44 For examples of non-statutory class actions in the securities field, see York v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 49 (3d
Cir. 1947), on the merits, 99 F. Supp. 808, 843-49 (D. Del. 1951); Amen v.
Black, 234 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1956), remanded for dismissal pursuant to
settlement, 355 U.S. 600 (1958).
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the class, such as purchasers who knew or should have known of the
misstatement in an action under Section 12 (2). It has been stated,
"Since each party may have a different claim or defense, it is doubt-
ful if any party ever adequately represents any other in all phases of
the case." 5 As Professor Chafee put it with his usual felicity of ex-
pression, "[T]he ideal situation for a representative suit is one in
which the resemblances among members of the class are strong and
the differences among them slight."46
(b) Common Relief Is Sought
It has been held in several cases under the Securities Act, as well
as under the Securities Exchange Act, that "common relief" may be
sought by buyers or sellers of securities, within the meaning of the
Rule, notwithstanding the obvious fact that individual plaintiffs may
have suffered losses differing in amount."7
In Oppenheimer v. F. 1. Young & Co., the Second Circuit said
that, if "it were to read into the rule a requirement that each bond-
holder must recover damages at the same rate as seems to have been
done by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit in Farm-
ers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101, 105,
there would be few situations to which the action would apply."4
If the requirements of the Rule are otherwise satisfied and the case
goes to judgment for the plaintiffs (as to the common questions of
law and fact) on the merits, the question of the precise amount of
damages can be referred to a special master.49
(c) Persons Constituting [the] Class Are So Numerous as to
Make It Impractical to Bring Them All Before the Court.
This would be true in almost every public offering of securities
subject to the Securities Act. It has been held that forty holders of
notes constituted a group large enough to permit a class action on
their behalf."0 Another court has held that twenty-nine (29) poten-
tial plaintiffs would not be too numerous to bring them all before
the court.5'
As previously stated, in cases under the Securities Act there is a
strong policy argument that the ultimate effectiveness of the civil
45 Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 58 (1937).
46 CHAFER, SOME PROBLEMS OF EquITY 208 (1950).
47 Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd on
other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144
F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944).
48 144 F.2d 387, 390.
49 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587-90 (10th Cir.
1961).
50 Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Banl 143 F.2d 261, 264 (8th Cir.
1944).
5' Phillips v. Sherman, 197 F. Supp. 866, 869 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
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liability provisions may depend in large measure on the applicability
of the class action device. Hence, numbers alone should not be the
controlling consideration.
In Section 302 (a) (1) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939," an-
other in the series of SEC statutes, Congress found that the national
public interest was adversely affected when individual action by in-
vestors "for the purpose of protecting and enforcing their rights is
rendered impracticable by reason of the disproportionate expense of
taking such action." And under the antitrust laws it has been said
that "to permit the defendants to contest liability with each claimant
in a single, separate suit, would in many cases give defendants an
advantage which would be almost equivalent to dosing the door of
justice to all small claimants." 3
When there are a great many parties plaintiff, this undesirable
result can be avoided only by bringing a single (class) action. Al-
though it has been stated that Rule 23 (a) (3) is merely a permis-
sive joinder device,5" and Rules 20 (a) and 24 (b), with respect to
joinder and intervention, provide means for the determination in a
single action of a common question of fact or law involved in causes
of action belonging to different persons, the latter rules may not be
effective where, as is often the situation in Securities Act cases, the
parties are unknown to each other. It would appear that there is
inherent in Rule 23 a supervisory power in the court to protect the
rights of all members of the class."5 If the common question class
action was intended to have as its only function an alternative
method of permissive joinder, there would be no logical reason for
its being made a part of Rule 23 instead of another means of joinder
under Rule 20.56 As stated in Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley5 Rule 23 (a) (3) has "a broader purpose-to allow a final
determination of common questions of law and fact. Otherwise...
we would ... be brought to the point of saying,'.. . that where it
is impracticable to bring all the parties before the court they must
nevertheless be brought before the court.' ""
(d) Fairly Insure the Adequate Representation of All.
The plaintiff and his counsel must fairly insure the adequate rep-
resentation of the class. It has been held in the leading case of
52 53 Stat. 1150 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a) (1) (1958).
53 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
54 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 42, ff 23.10.
55 With respect to necessity of court approval of settlements, see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c).
58 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962).
57 300 F.2d 561 (loth Cir. 1962).
58 300 F.2d 561, 589; See also Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function
of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Rav. 684 (1941).
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Oppenheimer v. F. 1. Young & Co.,5" that there is no need to go
beyond the face of the complaint in determining the adequacy of the
representation. "If it shall later appear that the plaintiffs are not
able within a reasonable time to obtain others to intervene in the
class action," the court added, "it may properly be dismissed as a
class action ....""
There is certainly no magic in numbers. It has been said, "con-
ceivably a single plaintiff with competent counsel may afford better
representation to the class than a great number of parties and a
multitude of counsel.""' In York v. Guaranty Trust Co.62 the plain-
tiff held notes in the face amount of only $6,000. In the Oppen-
heimer" case the plaintiffs themselves held only $10,000 in principal
amount of bonds compared to more than $3,000,000 repurchased
from investors in alleged violation of a fraud rule of the SEC. In
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp.," the named plaintiffs were
holders of 200 shares of stock, with a loss of $3,200, out of a total
number of 2,250,000 shares offered by the two registration state-
ments complained of in the suit, although twenty-two other persons
represented by the same attorneys were allowed to intervene prior to
settlement negotiations. 5
2. The Composition of the Class
As previously discussed, the class under Section 11 consists of
every person who purchased a security from either an underwriter
or in the open market on or after the effective date of the registra-
tion statement which contains the material misstatement or omission.
It thus includes an indefinite succession of buyers, subject only to
exclusion of (1) possibly those who are subject to the defense of the
state of limitations"6 or (2) those who purchased after the issuing
corporation had published an "earning statement covering a period
of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement" and who do not allege and prove reliance on
the misstatement or omission.
67
The class under Section 12 (1) would include those persons who
(1) purchased a security offered in interstate commerce before a
59 144 F.2d 387, (2d1 Cir. 1944).60 144 F.2d 387, 390. Accord, Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp.
934, 935 (D. Mass. 1962).
61 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 305-06 (Wright
rev. 1961).
62 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
63 144 F.2d 387.
64 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
65 See Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D. Mass. 1963).
r6 § 13, 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
67 § 11(a), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958).
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proper registration statement had been filed (2) from an immediate
seller who should have filed the proper registration statement. It
thus would not include a person who purchased on the open market
after a proper registration statement was filed or who purchased
from a person who was not required to file a registration statement.
The class under Section 12 (2) would normally include those
persons who bought directly from the underwriter or other person
furnishing the prospectus8 where the prospectus contained a mate-
rial misstatement or omission, subject to the exclusion of all those
purchasers who do not allege and prove lack of knowledge of the
untruth or omission. Hence, the class here is considerably narrower
than that under Section 11. A class action under this section could
be extremely important, nevertheless, because of the absence in Sec-
tion 12 (2) of (1) a defense of lack of causation and (2) the
limited reliance requirement of Section 11 (a). If the misstatement
or omission was oral, the members of the class would be limited
to those to whom it was communicated in substantially the same
manner.
3. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations with respect to Securities Act casese0 has
already been discussed in connection with each particular section of
the Act. It should be added that since the period of limitations is
contained in the same statute which creates the cause of action it is
a limitation on the continuation of the right and compliance with
the statute must be alleged in the complaint and proved."0
The key question is whether the timely filing of a "common ques-
tion" class action tolls the statute of limitations with respect to
other members of the class so that they may appear and prove their
claims afterward, even though the statute otherwise would have run
as to their claims. It has been uniformly held that "true" and "hy-
brid" class actions, i.e. under Federal Rule 23 (a) (1) and (2), toll
the statute, but until recently there was some doubt with respect to
"common question" class actions. The doubt was due to the state-
ment by Professor Moore that this type of class action was merely a
permissive joinder device. 71 However, in the Union Carbide case the
court in a well-reasoned opinion squarely held that in a Rule 23
(a) (3) action maintainable as such, "it is incongruous to say that
6S § 4(1), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958), in effect provides that
a prospectus must be delivered to every purchaser for the first forty days (or such
shorter period as the SEC may prescribe) after the effective date of the registra-
tion statement.
89 § 13, 48 Stat. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958)
70 Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F.2d 970, 971 (3d Cir. 1952).
71 3 Mooaa, op. ti. supra note 42, ff 23.10.
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the absent members, who are represented by those present may not
rely upon the commencement of the action by their brethren to toll
the running of the statute. This would only serve to 'convert the rule
into a trap' for those who have expeditiously allowed their rights
to be maintained by a class action." Other recent cases and articles
appear to be virtually unanimous in favor of the tolling of the
statute.2
Nevertheless, there never has been a United States Supreme Court
ruling precisely on this point (nor on the availability of Rule 23
(a) (3) to actions under the Securities Act, for that matter) so the
only absolutely safe course is for as many aggrieved stockholders as
possible to intervene in the class action "within one year after the
discovery of the untrue statement or omission or after discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence," but
in no event more than three years after the security was offered for
sale.
4. Notice to the Class
In view of the disproportionate costs of prosecuting an action
under the Securities Act in comparison to the loss the particular
stockholder may have incurred, it is important that other injured
stockholders participate in the action. The ethical problems of giving
notice to the class without court approval are beyond the scope of
this article. However, there are some who think that such a problem
may exist, and included in that category most assuredly will be
counsel for the defendant.
One court has stated that "under the present version of the Fed-
eral Rules... a court in which a spurious [dassl action has been
pleaded has the power to order at any stage of the case that notice
of the pendency of the action be given to 'absent persons that they
may come in and present claims and defenses if they so desire,'"
citing MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND OFFICIAL FORMS 562-64
(1961)." However, this same court refused to direct or authorize
the plaintiffs to give notice of the action under the Securities Act to
the appropriate classes of stockholders at the outset of the suit be-
cause of the fear that such notice would result in the inference that
the court thought that the action was well-founded.74
72 See, e.g., Newberg v. American Dryer Corp., 195 F. Supp. 345, 349 (E.D. Pa.
1961) (SEC case); 2 BAR.oN & HoLTZOrF, op. cit. supra note 61 § 568 at
315-16 and cases cited nn. 15.4 and 15.5.
73 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 935 (D. Mass. 1962).
74 Cf. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941). There the court,
having held that there was not adequate representation because, inter alia, there
was lack of notice to the class, said, "Affirmative notice could have been given
by them to others in the class, showing that they had, by letter or by newspaper,
brought the existence of the present suit to the attention of others of the class."
125 F.2d at 94.
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In the Union Carbide case, the court ordered notice to the class
after a favorable jury verdict for the plaintiffs was obtained. "' The
opinion of the court does not indicate whether authorization of
notice prior to trial was requested.
It is submitted that, in order to carry out the intent of Congress
in enacting the Securities Act and providing a deterrent effect on
wrongdoers, notice should be authorized by the court no later than
at the time of a favorable ruling for the plaintiff on a motion for
summary judgment, or at a pre-trial hearing after a reasonable
amount of discovery proceedings. Otherwise many meritorious secu-
rities actions could well "die on the vine" for lack of funds to prose-
cute them properly.
5. Intervention
Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
"Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in
an action . . . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common." It should
be noted that intervention in class actions will not introduce any new
legal or factual issues, and thus would neither unduly delay the pro-
ceedings nor prejudice the rights of the original parties.
With respect to intervention in class actions it has been stated:
Once it has been determined that an action is a, class action, there
seems little justification for denying intervention by other members
of the class. This is especially true if the action is thought not
binding on persons not named since intervention will permit them
to share the benefits of the judgment.76
Since a common question class action has been held in some juris-
dictions to be binding only upon those persons who are actual
parties, no member of the class can be absolutely sure of benefiting
from a favorable judgment unless he is allowed to intervene. It is
not believed that this application of the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel is good law and most courts have rejected it." However,
there is respectable authority to the contrary. s
There is yet another reason why there should be at least some
interventions. In two leading class action cases involving violations
75 300 F.2d 561, 587-90.
76 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 61, § 568 at 315; see also Speed v.
Transamerica Corp. 100 F. Supp. 461, 463 (D. Del. 1951).
77 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 91 (7th Cir. 1941); Union Carbide and
Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962); Note, The Binding
Effect of Class Actions, 67 HA.v. L. Rlv. 1059 (1954).
78 Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944); see also
Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1959); 3 MooRE, op. cit.
supra note 42, 1 23.11 (3).
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of the federal securities laws both courts strongly indicated that if
there were no interventions the class action would be dismissed."9
In the Oppenheimer case the court stated ". . . if it would later ap-
pear that the plaintiffs are not able within a reasonable time to
obtain others to intervene in the class action it might properly be
dismissed as a class action." This principle was reasserted in the
Transitron case. Neither court made any constructive suggestions as
to how to "obtain" others to intervene. This question has been
touched upon above under the heading Notice to the Class.
In the Union Carbide case, the court allowed intervention even
after trial so that all members of the class, insofar as they could
prove damages, could share in the judgment obtained by their rep-
resentatives.
6. Dismissal and Compromise
Rule 23 (c) of the Federal Rules requires approval of the court
before a class action can be dismissed or compromised. Notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise to members of the class is
not required in an action under Rule 23(a) (3), but most courts
will probably insist on such notice, especially if it is held that the
statute of limitations has been tolled and that the judgment is bind-
ing upon all members of the class.
7. Trial by pury
(a) Individual Action
We have seen that the Securities Act provides that proceedings
may be brought "either at law or in equity." Since the Securities Act
was passed before the procedural merger of law and equity by the
Federal Rules in 1938, it would appear that the above language
intends to provide the plaintiff with the full panoply of otherwise
available federal remedies, and, as far as it pertains to jury trial,
refers to the pre-existing law under the Seventh Amendment; if the
action is at law the plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to a jury
trial; if it is in equity, he is not."0
Several actions under the Securities Act have been tried to a jury.8'
The fact that the action is founded solely -on a statute passed since
1791 is irrevelant. The key is the remedy sought. If the plaintiff is
suing for money damages, he is entitled to a jury trial, since this is
"a claim wholly legal in its nature."82 Hence, a jury trial is available
79 Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944); Cherner
v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
80 Loss, SEcuarTES REGULATION, 1849-51 (1961).
81 See e.g., Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
726; Schiluer v. H. Vaughn Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943).
82 Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962).
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in all actions under Section 11 and in those under Sections 12(1)
and 12 (2) where the plaintiff has sold his stock.
(b) Class Action
It would seem that since the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in
an individual action, the class would be entitled to a jury trial in the
class action. It might be argued that since the class action originally
developed in equity, there is no right to jury trial, regardless of the
nature of the underlying claim. One of the first class actions brought
under Rule 23 (a) (3) sought damages in an anti-trust action.83 The
court refused to permit maintaining the suit as a class action because
damages were a legal remedy properly triable to a jury and a class
action was equitable in nature and not triable to a jury. This case
has been criticized by both the commentators and the courts and has
not been followed."' Even Professor Moore, who has taken a con-
servative view with respect to Rule 23(a) (3) on several issues "r
(and has given these actions the opprobrious designation "spuri-
ous"), agrees with the later cases, stating, "Where the issues pre-
sented in a class action are legal there is a right to jury trial....
On the other hand, where the issues are equitable there is no right
to jury trial."8
Thus it has been established by virtually every case that a class
action may be brought to enforce a legal claim. The courts have
recognized the separate aspects of the common question class action
and disallow a jury trial on the issues of the propriety of the class
action and the size and composition of the class," but allow a jury
trial on the underlying claim if the claim itself is legal."8
The jury will not be concerned with the various questions about
the size of the class under Sections 11 or 12, nor with the admission
of individuals to those classes, nor with the calculation of the dam-
ages of each individual. The only basic issues the jury will be asked
to consider in a case under Section 11 are (1) the truth and mate-
riality of the statements in the prospectus, (2) the reasonable care
83 Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 735 (D.
Iowa 1942), modified, 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942).
84 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 61 § 571, at 345 and cases cited n.
79.3; Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962).85 3 MooRE, op. ct. supra note 42, ch. 23.
86 5 MooRa, op. cit. rupra note 42, I" 38.38(2) at 304.
87 BAI o N & HOLazOFF, op. ct. supra note 61, at 310, 345 and cases cited nn. 4
and 79.488 In the Transitron case, defendant's motion to strike the claim for jury trial was
denied. The Court stated, "Inasmuch as [the class count] seeks money damages
for alleged violations under § 11, that count also involves a suit at common law
for which the right of trial by jury has been preserved by the Seventh Amend-




of a defendant other than the issuer and (3) the causal connection
between the untruths or omissions and the decline in value of the
security if the defense of lack of causation is pleaded." None of
these issues is beyond the competence of a jury." Since the damage
to each member of the class could be ascertained by a special master
after trial,91 the jury in the class action would have a function differ-
ing little in complexity from that which it would have in an indi-
vidual action. Moreover, the availability of such devices as special
verdicts, the use of a master, or the possibility of separate trials on
various issues (such as the defense of lack of causation under Sec-
tion 11) provide the court with powerful tools in shaping the litiga-
tion to avoid any problems which might arise.
8. Binding Effect of Judgment
The most perplexing question remaining with respect to Rule
23(a) (3) class actions is whether a judgment therein, either on the
merits or by way of approving a settlement, binds members of the
class who are not parties. This question has already been touched
upon in the discussions of the tolling of the statute of limitations
and necessity of intervention by members of the class.
Nearly all of the early cases have held that only those persons
who are actually parties to the litigation are bound by a judgment
in a common question class action. However, as early as 1941, the
Seventh Circuit stated that all members of the alleged class whose
interest was not adverse to that of the named plaintiffs would be
bound by any judgment 3 although at the same time it also formu-
lated a strict test as to the adequacy of representation. The court in
the Union Carbide case did not go so far as to meet the binding
effect question head on. However, it held that the statute of limita-
tions was tolled and that after the trial all members of the class
should be given notice and be permitted to intervene and prove
their claims, stating that "this ... solution results in the more ex-
peditious and efficient disposition of litigation and ought therefore
to be favored." It also stated that Rule 23 (a) (3) would serve "to
allow a final determination of common questions of law and fact."
Almost all of the commentators except Professor Moore maintain
that a judgment in a common question class action should bind all
members of the class as it does in a "true" class action under Rule
89 In actions under § 12(1) or (2) there is no defense of lack of causation.
90 Unlike the common law action of deceit, neither causation nor scienter nor ordi-
narily reliance need be alleged. For discussion see para. A. 1. (3) sapra.91 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962).
92 3 MOOR , FEDERAL PRACriICE 23.11, at 3465 and cases cited.
93 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
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23 (a) (1). Many point out that the Supreme Court decision in
Hansberry v. Lee95 was handed down in 1940, while Professor
Moore's views were formulated at the time the Federal Rules were
adopted in 1938.9 The court in the Lee case stated that due process
permits the judgment in a class action to be binding on absentees
whenever the procedure adopted "fairly insures the protection of the
interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."' The court
further stated by way of dictum that even in a common question
class action the judgment might be made binding on all members of
the class "provided that the procedures were so devised and applied
so as to insure that those present are of the same class as those
absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full
and fair consideration of the common issue."98
If ultimately the rule is developed that the judgment binds the
entire class, there will probably be a stricter rule as to what consti-
tutes adequacy of representation sufficient to allow the particular
common question class action at all.99 But if the court finds adequacy
of representation under a strict test it would seem that due process
has been satisfied and a judgment should then be res judicata as to
all members of the class.
The present uncertainty in regard to the binding effect of a judg-
ment in a common question class action also acts as a deterrent to
the settlement of such an action. As long as a defendant cannot be
certain (and he cannot, except possibly in the Seventh or Tenth
Circuits) that other members of the class could not bring suit
against him prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, he
will want to discount any settlement figure he otherwise would be
willing to pay.
In the Transitron case, which was settled after extensive discovery
proceedings but prior to trial for $5,300,000, the Court's judgment
approving the settlement barred any further action upon "any claim
94 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 61, § 572; Kalven and Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. Riy. 684 (1941);
Keeffe, Levy and Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORN. LQ. 327 (1948);
Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1954); CHAVEE,
op. cit. supra note 46, 250-58 (1950).
95 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
96 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 61, § 572 at 349. Professor Moore
played an active role in the drafting of Rule 23 and apparently proposed that the
Committee adopt a provision to the effect that a judgment in a 23(a) (3) class
action be ". . . conclusive upon only the parties and privies to the proceedings."
The committee did not accept this proposition. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp.
v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962) at 588, n. 13.
97 311 U.S. at 42.
98 Id. at 43.
9 See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
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embraced in the pleadings herein" after providing for notice to all
known members of the class by letter and by publication. However,
the court stated that the second court (in a subsequent action by a
member of the class who was not a party to the class action) will
be better equipped to determine whether there was adequacy of
representation with respect to the particular person bringing the
action."' In the present state of the law, this is as a practical matter
about as far as a District Judge can go.
CONCLUSION
At the moment there are many unresolved questions with respect
to common question class actions [Federal Rule 23 (a) (3)] brought
under the Securities Act of 1933. In an action which treads in both
of these areas there are more than the usual number of pitfalls.
Counsel bringing such an action must plan his strategy most care-
fully, and his tactics must take into account all of the above uncer-
tainties and more. Ethical problems and the possibility of intrusion
of other counsel are ever present.
If it were certain that a judgment would bind absent members of
the class, the problems of jurisdiction, of intervention and of the
statute of limitations all would be solved. But other problems obvi-
ously would still remain.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has recently proposed a
complete redraft of Federal Rule 23.0' Under this proposal, as soon
as practicable after the commencement of an action, the court would
decide whether it is to be maintained as a class action. If the court
so ordered, the judgment would bind all members of the class as
defined. However, it would appear that even under the proposed
Rule, whether the judgment were res jadicata as to all members of
the class, would not, as a practical matter, be determined by the
court in the class action itself, but could be tested only in a subse-
quent action.Y2
100 Chemer v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1963).
101 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts
Proposed by the Advisory Commission on Civil Rules, 34 F.R.D. 371, 385-96
( 1964).
102 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1963).
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